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ABSTRACT 
This chapter surveys the approaches for addressing privacy in open identity and access management 
systems that have been taken by a number of current systems. The chapter begins by listing important 
privacy requirements and discusses how three systems that are being incrementally deployed in the 
Internet, namely SAML 2.0, CardSpace, and eID, address these requirements. Subsequently, the findings 
of recent European research projects in the area of privacy for I&AM systems are discussed. Finally, the 
approach taken to address the identified privacy requirements by ongoing projects is described at a high 
level. The overall goal of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the diversity of privacy 
issues and techniques in the context of I&AM. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Identity and Access Management (I&AM) systems support access control, namely ensuring that access to 
certain resources is granted only if the requestor is properly authorized. For example, a company 
employee that accesses a company VPN (Virtual Private Network) while working from abroad is likely to 
be granted access by an access control system. Although I&AM systems are closely integrated with 
access control systems, their main function is to support the system administrators and the end users in 
performing maintenance procedures, such as managing access credentials, user roles, access rights, rights 
delegation, auditing, and relationships between organizational units, throughout the lifetime of the system. 
Over the last fifty years, many I&AM systems with a wide range of functions have been developed. Such 
systems are typically composed of a number of modules, each with a specific task. Some I&AM systems 
are as simple as a database with authorized username/password pairs, while others are complex 
distributed systems that could include sophisticated policy decision points, interconnection with business 
process engines, accounting and billing infrastructures, credential negotiation agents, customer 
relationship management systems, administrative interfaces for the lifetime management of 
comprehensive user profiles, and provisions for auditing. Many I&AM systems are closed, i.e. they are 
designed for environments where there is a single system provider, such as a company or government 
organization, that has a very strong relationship with the prospective users. 
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The focus of this chapter is open I&AM systems, i.e. systems that cover multiple organizations. In the 
context of such systems, users interact with a range of different organizations using one or more 
credentials. New users may be introduced into the system by multiple parties, or users may be able to 
independently create new accounts for themselves. In open systems there is clearly a need for 
interoperability, and thus standardization is probably more important than in closed systems; privacy also 
plays a central role. Users should, for example, be able to control the degree of dissemination of their 
personal information to organizations and other users. The particular focus of this chapter is the various 
degrees of privacy achieved by current open I&AM systems, and what issues need to be addressed in 
future such systems. 
 
PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS FOR I&AM SYSTEMS 
The need for user privacy in open I&AM system arises from the need to reduce the risks of unnecessary 
or otherwise unwanted disclosure of personal information. In recent years, legislation in Europe, both at 
EU and at national levels, has become an important driver for the introduction of privacy and 
transparency enhancing techniques within I&AM systems. This is because many of these laws require 
businesses to follow the principles of data minimization, data protection, and, in some cases, data 
retention. The data minimization principle requires that personal data is not disclosed to a transacting 
partner unless that information is strictly needed in order to carry out the transaction. In order to establish 
such strict necessity, the purpose of disclosure must be specified for each data item to be disclosed. Data 
protection and retention require that users have access to, and can update, their personal information when 
it is stored at an organization, but also that organizations have to keep records in a way that facilitates 
effective investigation of past transactions. In this context, „personal data‟ is any data that could 
potentially lead to the identification of an individual, even if this is only possible in combination with 
additional information. 
The following more concrete requirements arise from the requirement to minimize the personal data that 
is transferred between parties. We say that a privacy-preserving I&AM system should enable its users to: 
 selectively disclose personal data to organizations and other users; 
 create multiple identities or pseudonyms; 
 attach different pieces of personal information to different identities; 
 review data disclosed in the past; 
 maintain different identities towards different organizations; 
 formulate „sticky‟ policies that follow personal data and that govern under which conditions the 
data may be disclosed and used; 
 minimize the amount of trust users are required to place in third parties and infrastructural 
components in general; and 
 provide explicit consent for sharing personal information, and enable users to revoke previously 
given consent. 
Of course, achieving all the above in a usable manner, i.e. without placing too great a burden on users and 
system administrators, is very challenging. 
The above requirements can be roughly captured by the following criteria. They can be used to evaluate 
I&AM systems with respect to their privacy-friendliness. 
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Trust model 
Some I&AM systems are designed so that a remote entity, typically called the „Identity Provider‟ (IdP), 
stores and manages the user‟s personal information. Users are typically authenticated by an IdP, and are 
then able to access their own information and forward it to requesting parties. While this has the 
advantage of mobility – users may use the system from any computer and any location – this model also 
raises significant privacy issues. This is because the trusted party not only learns the personal data of the 
user, but will also gain information about the behaviour and relationships of the user, since other parties 
will refer to the trusted party every time they require user data and or assurances about user authenticity.  
Moreover, the trusted party must be relied upon not to assert that a user has been authenticated when this 
has not occurred, and/or to assert false information about the personal attributes of a user (as discussed in 
(Alrodhan & Mitchell, 2010)). 
Of course, the privacy issues arising from the use of a third party IdP can to some extent be mitigated if 
the user is able to choose which IdP to use. This issue of choice arose starkly in the case of Passport, 
Microsoft‟s initial attempt to solve the identity management problem by making itself the IdP for 
everyone.  As has been widely documented, the notion of trusting Microsoft with large quantities of 
personal data gave rise to a widespread and violent negative reaction, which clearly took Microsoft by 
surprise (Kormann & Rubin, 2000).  Indeed, this informed Microsoft‟s subsequent effort in this space, the 
CardSpace system, discussed later in this chapter. Of course to be effective, choice requires a rich 
ecosystem of entities prepared to act as IdPs, and this ecosystem is still at an early stage of evolution.  
Moreover, even as and when such an ecosystem develops, not all users will be equipped with the means 
to decide which IdPs they can trust with mission-critical personal data. 
An approach in which personal data, such as attributes and certificates, are stored on the user‟s own 
computer and are then disclosed directly to the parties that require it, is likely to be more privacy-friendly. 
Such an approach, however, is less convenient, since mobility is no longer guaranteed and the users may 
have to perform a greater number of administrative tasks. It also increases the importance of security 
management of the platform on which the user information is stored. 
Ultimately it all comes down to trust.  Users will have to make a trust decision with regard to the handling 
of personal data, either in terms of the use of a trusted third party (e.g. an IdP) or a personal platform.  
Sadly, recent history suggests that this is a highly problematic issue, since users are known to make poor 
trust decisions with regard to the handling of personal data, as the many issues identified with social 
networking sites have proved (Hogben, 2007). 
 
Multiple unlinkable identities 
The notion of a user identity is commonly defined as the set of personal information for that user 
(attributes, certificates, credentials, and other statements concerning the individual). The user may 
„compose‟ one or more personal identities by grouping relevant pieces of personal information. Identities 
do not need to be consistent; for example, one identity may include the user‟s real name and address, 
whereas a pseudonym (e.g. a nickname) and address (or no address at all) may be included in another. 
The grouping of data into identities makes it easier for a user to switch between contexts or roles. Note 
that the literature sometime uses the term „virtual identity‟ in order to refer to such a composed identity 
(see, e.g. (Aguiar, 2010)). 
In closed systems users are typically restricted to a single identity, whereas open systems typically do not 
have such a restriction. In particular, if the I&AM system interacts with multiple organizations that can 
each identify users, it may be desirable for users to be able to use different identities with different 
organizations. Moreover, in order to achieve data minimization, mechanisms should be provided to 
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prevent collaborating organizations from linking a given user‟s profile at one organization with the same 
user‟s profile at another. While it is relatively easy to let users create and maintain multiple identities for 
themselves, ensuring that these identities remain unlinkable is not straightforward. In particular, there is 
always a risk that usage patterns and attribute values leak enough information to link the identities of a 
given user. The system itself, however, should not prevent privacy-conscious users from maintaining 
identities that are effectively unlinkable (up to certain inherent limits, discussed in (Pashalidis & Meyer, 
2006) and (Pashalidis & Mitchell, 2004)). 
 
Selective disclosure 
Selective disclosure requires that it is both possible and simple for a user to disclose only part of an 
identity to a given requestor. If, for example, the system has registered the user‟s date of birth, it should 
be possible to disclose only the user‟s age or even age group (e.g. 18–25) without having to install a 
separate identity or undergo a lengthy registration process. 
 
Consent 
Personal data can be used for a wide range of purposes. If, for example, a user wishes to buy electronic 
goods that are shipped via email, then the user must disclose his email address. However, an online shop 
may wish to employ a user‟s email address for other purposes, such as research or marketing. A privacy-
preserving I&AM system should enable a user to be asked for explicit consent for such secondary uses of 
personal information. Similar provisions should be implemented regarding data retention times where 
input is needed from the user. The system should also support the revocation of consent, for example if 
the user no longer wishes to be contacted by the other party 
 
Privacy respecting sharing of personal information 
Sometimes it is necessary for a piece of personal information to be transferred from one organization to 
another. If, for example, a user orders a book from an online shop, the shop must be able to forward the 
user‟s address to the shipping company in order for the book to be delivered. In such situations it should 
be possible for the user to define a policy that tells the shop for which purposes and to which recipients 
the data is permitted to be forwarded. The notion of a „sticky policy‟ is similar to consent solicitation in 
that they both enable the user to define acceptable retention periods, purposes, and authorized recipients. 
The difference, however, is that while consent only applies to the first recipient of personal information, a 
sticky policy is „stuck‟ to the data. This means that the policy is visible and applies to all „downstream‟ 
data processors, i.e. everyone to whom the data is disclosed in the context of a process of the I&AM 
system. Note that there is an interplay between privacy-respecting sharing of personal information and 
revocation of consent: if personal data has been already shared, then effective revocation of consent 
becomes very challenging; effectively revoking consent would, for example, require dynamic updates to 
sticky policies. To the best of our knowledge, to date no deployed I&AM has tackled this problem. 
 
SOME COMMON SYSTEMS 
We next examine some widely discussed protocols used by open I&AM systems. It is important to 
observe that products offer a variety of user interfaces and varying degrees of usability and functionality. 
Moreover, as open I&AM systems are developing rapidly both in the technical and legal dimensions, so 
are the interfaces and functionality of individual products.  Hence it is of limited use to evaluate current 
implementations at a very fine level of detail.  It is more valuable to examine the protocols that are used 
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to support I&AM systems. Because these protocols are standardized, they are more likely to be stable 
than user interfaces and software functionality sets, which change much more frequently. 
In particular, we examine the privacy properties of SAML 2.0, CardSpace, and electronic ID.  The reader 
should keep in mind that these systems focus more on identity management rather than access 
management.  Access management infrastructures, typically located in the backend of an organization‟s 
infrastructure, are largely orthogonal to the processes that affect the systems below.  Nevertheless, much 
current research, as outlined later in this chapter, is aimed at achieving a tighter integration between 
identity and access management, for example by enabling policy evaluations to be distributed over 
multiple domains. 
 
SAML 2.0 
SAML, which stands for „Security Assertions Markup Language‟, is a set of web services protocols used 
in web services, and is standardized by OASIS. SAML versions 1.0 (Haller-Baker & Maler, 2002) and 
1.1 (Maler, Mishra & Philpott, 2003) were published in 2002 and 2005, respectively.  SAML 2.0 (Cantor, 
Kemp, Philpott & Maler, 2005), specifies protocols enabling organizations to exchange data about users. 
The typical use case involves a user that is authenticated by an organization called an Identity Provider 
(IdP), who maintains an account for the user.  
The IdP can authenticate users by a variety of methods (Kemp et. al., 2005). The scheme is not restricted 
to a single IdP, and users may choose their preferred IdP from a list that contains all IdPs that are 
recognized by the website which they wish to access. The specifications also provide data structures 
which enable the IdP to send attributes it stores about a user to other websites in a manner that enables the 
receiving websites to verify the validity of the attributes. It is up to the IdP to provide user interfaces 
through which users can compose identities and exercise selective disclosure. Selective disclosure can be 
exercised if the user is given the opportunity to specify policies that tell the IdP which potential recipients 
are allowed to see which attributes, or by explicitly asking the user to confirm attribute disclosures every 
time they are about to take place. Both approaches have usability disadvantages. 
SAML 2.0 and access management XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup Language), another 
OASIS standard (Moses, 2005), specifies a format for access control policies as well as formats for 
messages that can be used by a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) to request a policy decision from a Policy 
Decision Point (PDP). The XACML SAML profile (Anderson & Lockhart, 2005) specifies how XACML 
messages can be sent inside SAML 2.0 messages. This specification involves a close integration of 
Identity and Access Management technologies.  In a typical use case, some of the XACML-enhanced 
SAML 2.0 messages, typically exchanged between a PEP and a PDP, will carry personal data, such as 
attributes. This standard enables more elaborate access management because it enables one domain to 
outsource policy decisions to another domain. However, use of the standard is also likely to increase the 
risk of privacy breaches because the exchanged messages may contain personal user information (e.g. 
attributes) and, while this information may be necessary to reach an access control decision, the messages 
are forwarded across domain boundaries The particular risk level, however, depends on the details of the 
deployment. 
 
CardSpace 
CardSpace is a software product produced by Microsoft that enables users to manage their identities on 
their own computer.  In Microsoft terminology it is an „identity metasystem‟, i.e. a system that aims to 
accommodate multiple, ideally all, Identity Management systems and offer a unified user experience 
towards the user.  Cardspace offers suitable abstractions for processes such as the creation of identities 
(i.e. grouping together attributes), authentication of remote websites, and remembering histories of 
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disclosed personal information. Cardspace has been designed to promote adoption of Identity 
Management systems by presenting these abstractions to the user in a self-explanatory and easy to use 
manner, namely in the form of „Information Cards‟.  Each such card can contain a range of different types 
of personal information, and part or all of the contexts of such a card can be selected for disclosure to a 
remote website. 
CardSpace conforms to the Identity Metasystem Interoperability Standard (Jones & McIntosh, 2009) and 
supports “U-Prove” anonymous credentials (Brands, 2000). According to (Jones & McIntosh, 2009), 
„Information Cards can be used both at applications hosted on Web sites accessed through Web browser 
and rich client applications directly employing Web services‟.  In a typical use case, however, while 
composition and selection of cards is done at the user‟s computer, the personal information itself may be 
stored at a variety of providers on the Internet.  CardSpace can handle different types and formats of 
credentials, claims and attributes including SAML 2.0 and the recently specified protocol for U-Prove 
credentials (Paquin, 2010).  Even though it is envisaged that Information Cards reside on the user‟s 
computer, most use cases require a wider infrastructure, with IdPs that authenticate users and provide 
assertions containing personal data.  That is, the IdP and potentially other parties such as attribute and 
storage providers, are likely to be actively involved whenever the user chooses to show a card to a remote 
website. 
As we have discussed, in CardSpace an IdP provides interested parties with statements about the 
attributes of a user.  The system allows the recipient of such statements to be confident that the user with 
which it is communicating is the rightful holder of such attributes.  If the attributes include a unique 
identifier, then the system thereby provides a means for a party to (indirectly) authenticate a user.  That is, 
in some sense CardSpace combines attribute management with the provision of user authentication 
services.  This property is shared by a number of other identity management systems.  However, other 
identity management systems, such as Liberty
i
, deal only with the issue of authentication.  By restricting 
scope in this way, the privacy implications are much reduced, since in Liberty the IdP solely provides 
statements about whether a user (identified by a pseudonym) has been authenticated. 
Finally we observe that CardSpace has the capability to reduce the trust requirement on IdPs not to 
monitor user activity (as discussed under Trust model above). A CardSpace IdP provides statements about 
user attributes, but, depending on which cryptographic options are in use, may not be required to know to 
which party this statement is being provided. 
 
eID 
eID, which stands for electronic IDentity, refers to efforts inside the European Union to introduce the 
electronic equivalent of national identity cards to its citizens. An eID solution typically takes the form of a 
smart card embedded into a credit-card-sized plastic card. An eID card can be used to authenticate a 
citizen, and to share information about the citizen that has been verified by the issuer of the card, i.e. the 
government. One rationale for the introduction of eID is an expected reduction of costs in the public 
sector resulting from its role in enabling citizens to interact electronically with government services.  
However, eID applications are not necessarily restricted to government applications; any business could 
decide to accept eID cards in order to identify or collect information about its customers. In some 
countries, e.g. in Germany, eID cards are likely to be able to generate so-called „qualified signatures‟. 
These signatures can be used to sign legally binding contracts, and, because of special technical 
protection measures, are exoected to have greater legal weight than non-qualified signatures. 
A number of countries have introduced eID cards, for example Estonia and Belgium, and other countries 
are planning such a deployment; indeed, only a minority of EU member states do not have plans to roll 
out an eID in the future (Naumann & Hogben, 2009).  Unfortunately, the eID systems of different 
countries differ to such an extent that future interoperability may be hindered (Naumann & Hogben, 
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2009).  In order to prevent this from happening, efforts are underway to harmonize the eID landscape and 
to introduce more stringent privacy measures
ii
.  It is important to keep in mind that many of the 
differences are due to differing national legal frameworks (Naumann & Hogben 2009, Jentzsch 2010). 
Given the diversity of national legal frameworks, it is no surprise that different eID systems have different 
properties with respect to protecting citizen privacy.  Apart from the the German eID system, all deployed 
systems of which we aware produce a signature in order to authenticate the citizen.  This is a violation of 
the data minimization principle since, when used for authentication only, the signature reveals more 
information about the citizen than is strictly necessary (Naumann & Hogben, 2009).  The protocol used 
by the German eID card, called PACE (shown to be secure in Bender, Fischlin & Kügler 2009), 
circumvents this problem. 
The type of data that is stored on different national eID cards, as well as the conditions under which 
access to this data is granted, also differs greatly from one system to the other.  For example, currently the 
chips used in Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Germany store a picture of a citizen‟s face, but only 
the German system restricts access to governmental services, whereas those used in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Portugal impose no such access restrictions.  Similarly, currently only the Austrian and 
the German cards support pseudonymous transactions, in the sense that different organizations get to see 
different identifiers for the citizen/card; other schemes reuse the same identifier for the citizen and/or card 
across contexts, thereby enabling colluding organizations to breach privacy by linking the transaction 
histories of any given citizen.  It should be mentioned, however, that certain countries, e.g. Belgium, 
legally prohibit organizations from storing any long-term identifiers that are retrieved from the card, 
thereby reducing the risk level.  For more information on the differences of eID approaches, the reader is 
referred to (Naumann & Hogben, 2009) and (Modinis-IDM consortium, 2006). A European eID card, 
called the European Citizen Card (ECC) is currently being specified; this specification supports 
unlinkable pseudonyms, and the different possibilities to integrate ECC with SAML 2.0 are investigated 
in (Eichholz, Hühnlein & Schwenk, 2009). 
 
Other systems 
SAML 2.0, CardSpace and eID are certainly not the only I&AM systems. We conclude this discussion on 
existing systems by briefly mentioning some other widely discussed examples of such systems. 
The Liberty Alliance Project (usually abbreviated to Liberty), which went public in 2001, is one of the 
most prominent collaborative efforts aiming at building open standard-based specifications for identity 
federation systems.   The Liberty model is essentially that of an Internet single sign-on (SSO) system.  In 
this scheme, a principal (or a user) can federate its various identities to a single identity issued by an 
identity provider, so that the user can access services provided by service providers belonging to the same 
circle of trust by authenticating just once to the identity provider.  This relies on a pre-established 
relationship between the identity provider and every service provider in the circle of trust.  As stated 
above, Liberty does not support the management of personal information, and provide only authentication 
services. 
Shibboleth is an open source federated identity management system that has been developed by the 
Internet2 consortium.  It offers standards-based authentication and authorization systems.  Shibboleth 
mandates identity federation, in which the IdP and the service provider systems consuming user 
information exchange public key certificates.  Unlike in Liberty, the IdP and the serve provider do not 
have to establish long-term shared pseudonyms during the federation process (but they can if they wish).  
Instead of long-term pseudonyms, the IdP and SP can use short-term random IDs to help preserve user 
privacy and maintain anonymity.  The latest version of Shibboleth, version 2.0, is based on SAML 2.0. 
OpenID is an open source identity management system in which IdPs issue their users with „global‟ 
identifiers that can be used to log-in to any service provider.  OpenID is somewhat different in nature to 
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SAML 2.0, CardSpace, Liberty and Shibboleth, and relies on a rather different model.  In OpenID, an IdP 
issues a user with a global identifier (or OpenID) that can be used to log-in to any OpenID-enabled 
service provider.  This identifier is typically a URL, and identifies the IdP that issued it.  Obviously, there 
is no need for pseudonyms in this system, since IdPs and the SPs can refer to a user using the OpenID 
global identifier. There is no identity federation process in OpenID; however, if a user already holds an 
service provider-issued identifier, then the service provider may choose to „locally‟ link this identifier 
with the user OpenID (i.e. the IdP-issued global identifier).  Of course, since everything is based on a 
global identifier, OpenID does not support any degree of anonymity or pseudonymity, and hence is much 
less privacy-friendly than the other systems we have discussed. 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH PROJECTS 
We briefly discuss some of the approaches taken by three recently finished European research projects in 
the area of I&AM, namely DAIDALOS, SWIFT, and PRIME.  The European projects discussed here are 
all large scale research collaborations involving a significant number, typically between 15 and 40, of 
partners representing both industry and academia.  The lengths of the projects discussed range from 30 
months to four years.  
DAIDALOS
iii
 , a project with nearly 40 partners, involved two consecutive phases that ran from 2003 to 
2008, involved a number of mobile phone operators including Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, 
Telekom India, and Telefonica (Spain).  According to the project website, its overall goal was to „design, 
prototype and validate the necessary infrastructure and components for efficient distribution of services 
over diverse network technologies‟ and to „integrate complementary network technologies to provide 
pervasive and user-centred access to these services‟.  As a result of the broad scope of the project, it 
would be unfair to say that its focus was on I&AM. However, a significant part of the project was 
dedicated to I&AM and the related privacy issues.  In this context, DAIDALOS (in its second phase) 
introduced the concept of virtual identities.  A virtual identity is an index of pointers to personal 
information that may reside at various places in the network.  According to the project vision, users 
should be free to construct as many virtual identities for themselves as they wish, and choose where 
different items of personal information are stored.  The index would be stored at an IdP (perhaps the 
user‟s network operator), and would itself be identified by a random-looking pseudonym. 
DAIDALOS virtual identities are cross-layer in nature.  This is because it was recognized that lower 
communication layers trivially enable an adversary to link transactions, even if these transactions are 
made unlinkable at the application layer.  To this end, the adversary simply has to observe the user‟s 
Internet Protocol (IP) address; if the same IP address is used, with high probability the same user is 
behind the transaction.  The project introduced mechanisms that trigger a switch of all identifiers across 
the stack, namely MAC address, IP address and, if applicable, SIP address, whenever the user switches 
his VID at the application layer.  Moreover, multiple VIDs can be simultaneously active, with the 
consequence that the user‟s device will have an equal number of concurrently active MAC addresses and 
IP addresses (Aguiar, 2010). 
Whether or not the results of the DAIDALOS project with respect to privacy-enhancing I&AM will be 
taken up by industry and deployed in real mobile networks remains to be seen. Certainly many practical 
obstacles will have to be overcome, most importantly the introduction of the new infrastructure that 
enables different operators to interoperate. Moreover, the replication of the entire communication stack 
whenever the user switches a VID is likely to introduce potentially unacceptable performance 
degradation. 
The SWIFT (Secure Widespread Identities for Federated Telecommunications), was a 30-month project 
that built on the concept of DAIDALOS virtual identities. The main focus of the project was the 
integration of virtual identities into the authentication infrastructure of telecommunication operators, 
 9 
enterprises and ISPs. One important driver was the desire to support flexible charging and billing schemes 
as well as a form of single sign-on in which the user‟s ISP acts as an IdP, causing the user to be 
automatically logged into services on the Internet without further interaction (Azevedo 2008). 
One goal of the PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe) project was to develop a privacy-
preserving identity management system.  The approach it adopts makes use of cryptographic tools called 
„anonymous credentials‟.  Such credentials enable a level of data minimization that is not possible with 
conventional public key cryptography.  In particular, an anonymous credential enables a user to 
demonstrate possession of a certified attribute to third parties, while at the same time avoiding the 
disclosure of any unique identifiers that would enable different demonstrations of the same credential to 
be linked.  The project also developed an architecture that acts as a middleware component between an 
application and the repository that holds the user‟s personal information.  The architecture combines 
access control policies that support obligations, negotiation and trust management; for further detail, the 
reader is referred to (Sommer, Cassasa Mont & Pearson 2008). 
While DAIDALOS and SWIFT seem to assume that the user‟s data will be primarily stored by services 
(e.g. IdPs) in the network, PRIME‟s default mode of operation appears to assume that user data is 
managed on the user‟s own computer.  It should be emphasized that these two approaches are very 
different, because the former requires third parties to be entrusted with user data while the latter does not.  
The distinction is, however, a superficial one since, in principle, both modes of operation are possible.  
Meta-identity systems like Higgins
iv
 and Cardspace (Brands, 2000) make this degree of flexibility 
explicit. 
ONGOING RESEARCH PROJECTS 
This section presents currently running European research projects that, amongst other things, aim to 
improve privacy in open I&AM. 
PrimeLife 
PrimeLife
v
 (Privacy and Identity Management throughout Life) is a European project that aims to develop 
mechanisms that prevent the collection of the massive amounts of personal data that individuals leave 
behind in their online transactions.  The project takes a somewhat holistic approach, looking at the 
problem not only in specific domains, but in a range of domains and throughout an individual‟s lifetime.  
PrimeLife builds on the work done in PRIME
vi
, but also aims at addressing the requirements listed earlier 
in this chapter.  To this end, a number of mechanisms are being developed within the project.  These can 
be roughly divided into cryptographic primitives, transparency support tools, privacy enhancing 
technologies, mechanisms for access control, and user interface development. 
The cryptographic mechanisms build on previous work on anonymous credentials and related types of 
cryptosystem.  In this area, the project has developed more efficient mechanisms for the encoding of 
attributes and the revocation of anonymous credentials, as well as protocols that allow users to retrieve 
information from a server without the server learning which exactly item of information was disclosed.  
Research topics also include enforcement mechanisms to prevent excessive data sharing in the context of 
social networks, and a „trusted wallet‟ i.e. a software module that can manage sensitive information for 
multiple security modules. 
Transparency support tools are, in the view of the project, tools that enable the user to access data that is 
stored about the user at third parties, the purposes of data collection, and the risks involved in divulging 
further information.  First results aim to obtain an overview of technologies in this area, but also results 
on measuring privacy properties such as anonymity and unlinkability have been produced.  It should be 
noted here that the topic of how to obtain and communicate reliable privacy measurements to end users is 
very challenging and still in its infancy. 
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Privacy enhancing technologies considered within PrimeLife include mechanisms suitable for the 
establishment of collaborative groups, the management of trust for privacy-preserving reputation systems, 
and for querying large collections of personal information without compromising the privacy of the 
individuals that are represented in the data set.  In the area of access control, the project concentrates on 
how to capture the purpose for which personal data may be requested within access control policies, as 
well as the confidentiality of the policies themselves, and how users can define access control for data that 
is stored at external parties.  These external parties do not necessarily have to be trusted with the data, but 
only with encrypted versions of the data.  The project also aims to examine how such approaches can lead 
to better protection of biometric traits. 
Finally, the project aims to increase end user awareness about privacy issues and to provide useful 
controls to users.  This is to be achieved by implementing a variety of prototype user interfaces and 
subsequently conducting user studies in order to gain understanding of what abstractions and metaphors 
work in practice.  For more information, the reader is referred to (Camenisch & Samarati 2009) and 
(Fischer-Hübner, Wästlund & Raggett 2009), as well as the project website. 
 
TAS3 
TAS3 (Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services) is a project related to I&AM which aims to 
develop an architecture that deals with authentication of users and organizations, credential management, 
the establishment of trust between users and organizations, compliance considerations such as data 
protection policies, and a seamless integration into established business processes. 
One of the main differences between PrimeLife and TAS3 is that, while the former project focuses on 
improving different privacy-preserving techniques, TAS3 focuses on the specification and development 
of a concrete architecture that integrates such techniques, while addressing the challenges that arise from 
this integration.  Like PrimeLife, TAS3 also introduces mechanisms for the specification and 
management of policies that govern access to personal information.  In particular, the project specifies a 
comprehensive authorization infrastructure that takes into account the requirements from different 
stakeholders: the user‟s privacy preferences in the form of explicit consent and sticky policies, policies 
from multiple organizations, and input from a business process engine. 
Although the TAS3 architecture is generic and is designed to handle any type of information and personal 
data, the main scenarios targeted by the project are e-health and employability.  In the e-health scenario, 
sensitive medical data about patients must be made available to doctors, while it must also be ensured that 
non-authorized persons cannot access a patient‟s medical data.  Moreover, it must be guaranteed that the 
system can be audited, and hence a trustworthy log file of who accessed which files must be constructed.  
Emergency situations must also be addressed, where a doctor may need to access a patient‟s file even if 
the doctor could not do so in the absence of the emergency. 
The employability scenario, on the other hand, focuses on the situation where a user uploads CV data to a 
special server in order to support a search for a job; instead of the user manually filling out cumbersome 
forms at every potential employer‟s site, the system enables potential employers to see the required data 
from the user‟s uploaded CV.  This scenario highlights the need for the system to be able to handle 
complex structures in personal data, and to handle complex policies regarding the handling of data with 
respect to consent, purpose, and forwarding to third parties. 
Both the e-health and the employability scenarios provide a motivation for introducing a business process 
engine that orchestrates the overall information flows and that enables changes to the process to be 
introduced in a structured manner. 
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Organizations may not only use different policy formats, but also use different vocabularies when 
formulating their policies.  For example, while one organization might use the term „manager‟, another 
may use the term „supervisor‟ to refer to the same concept.  In order to address the resulting semantic 
interoperability issues, TAS3 is also developing modeling tools that capture the diversity of naming.  A 
dedicated TAS3 component is planned that will translate the affected policies into a common format at 
runtime.  More details of the TAS3 architecture are given in (Kellomäki 2009). 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter we have discussed privacy issues that arise in the context of I&AM, and provided a high 
level overview of how certain systems that are currently being used or developed address these issues.  
We have found that privacy protection plays a major role in the current I&AM landscape, and that most 
protocols are designed with at least some of the privacy requirements in mind.  Whilst privacy-protecting 
protocols and mechanisms are a necessity in order to achieve an overall system that is privacy friendly, 
their mere presence is not sufficient.  Assuming that privacy-protecting protocols are in place, the user 
interfaces of the system, as well as the degree to which the system enables users to exercise fine-grained 
control over the dissemination of their personal information, will to a large extent determine the level of 
privacy that can actually be obtained.  That is, the mode of operation imposed by the I&AM 
infrastructure, including the underlying trust assumptions, determine whether or not it is possible for users 
to retain their privacy. 
Finally, the usage of the system also affects privacy; if only one user is using the system then clearly there 
cannot be any privacy.  That is, whether or not the design and assumptions regarding future usage of the 
system matches the actual usage when it takes place, is also important.  Hence, the issue of privacy 
protection in the context of I&AM is likely to remain an important and active research area for the 
foreseeable future. 
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